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Abstract: In this article, I discuss access and benefit-sharing (ABS) for plant genetic resources from
an ethical perspective. This leads to the question of what types of justice actually play a role when
more equity and fairness is demanded for plant genetic resources. Five dimensions of justice will be
distinguished: classical distributive justice, which deals with a fair distribution of goods; commutative
justice, which concerns a fair exchange of “give-and-receive”; justice as recognition, which relates to
treating all involved parties with the same respect; reparative justice, which pertains to fair amendments
for wrongful actions in the past; and procedural justice, which is concerned with just decision processes.
Drawing on the discussion of ethical problems with biopiracy, the distribution of environmental burdens,
and plant genetic resources in agriculture, I will illustrate that the use of genetic resources poses challenges
across all five dimensions of justice. Because the combination of justice challenges is specific for each
case of resource use, I will argue that it is important that users of genetic resources are aware of the
complexity of justice problems to ensure fair and equitable ABS negotiations. “Justice” is a paramount
ideal underlying the debates on how to regulate and use plant genetic resources. We discuss questions such
as Who has rights to access and use these resources? How should benefits be shared? How should the use
of genetic resources be regulated?Who should be involved in discussing these questions? All of these are
questions concerning justice. They are asked and discussed with the aim of finding answers that take into
account what is due to all those who have a stake in genetic resources. I have written this overview article
from an understanding of justice in analytic philosophy.1 Although there is wide agreement that justice
is important, there may be different views on what it means to safeguard justice in the development of
policy as well as in specific access and benefit sharing negotiations. One reason for such disagreement
is that justice is a concept with different dimensions. I will distinguish between five such dimensions,
which all play a role in dealing with genetic resources. The aim of this analysis is to contribute to the
understanding of first, why the use of genetic resources generates so much attention and controversy, and
second, what needs to be considered in regulating and handling them justly. By discussing these issues,
I am addressing not only philosophers but also an interdisciplinary readership, hoping that the article
provides an occasion for them to take a step back from the everyday occupation with genetic resources
and to reflect on the ethical implications associated with their use. Ideally, this will contribute toward
bringing more justice reflections into the drafting or implementing of regulatory schemes. Moreover,
these reflections may facilitate specific access and benefit-sharing (ABS) negotiations, which may be
complicated by the fact that the different parties are prioritizing different dimensions of justice possibly
without awareness of this source of disagreement. After a brief introduction of the conception of justice
underlying this article, each of the five dimensions of justice will be presented separately. For this purpose,
I will start with a general introduction of the particularities of the respective justice dimension followed
by a discussion of the role that it plays in the context of genetic resources. In doing so, I will draw on
my own previous research and connect it to the philosophical work of other authors, for instance, Bram
de Jonge and Doris Schroeder. Moreover, I will connect the literature on justice for genetic resources
with parallel discourses on environmental justice or restorative justice. The presentation of the five
dimensions of justice will be followed by the discussion of three practical justice challenges to illustrate
how the justice dimensions meet: first, biopiracy; second, the distribution of environmental burdens; and
third, plant genetic resources in agriculture. The article will close with two practical conclusions for a
fair and equitable use of plant genetic resources.
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In this article, I discuss access and benefit-sharing (ABS) for plant genetic resources from 
an ethical perspective. This leads to the question of what types of justice actually play a role 
when more equity and fairness is demanded for plant genetic resources. Five dimensions of 
justice will be distinguished: classical distributive justice, which deals with a fair distribution of 
goods; commutative justice, which concerns a fair exchange of “give-and-receive”; justice 
as recognition, which relates to treating all involved parties with the same respect; reparative 
justice, which pertains to fair amendments for wrongful actions in the past; and procedural 
justice, which is concerned with just decision processes. Drawing on the discussion of 
ethical problems with biopiracy, the distribution of environmental burdens, and plant genetic 
resources in agriculture, I will illustrate that the use of genetic resources poses challenges 
across all five dimensions of justice. Because the combination of justice challenges is specific 
for each case of resource use, I will argue that it is important that users of genetic resources 
are aware of the complexity of justice problems to ensure fair and equitable ABS negotiations.
Keywords: access and benefit-sharing, commutative justice, Convention on Biological Diversity, distributive 
justice, environmental justice, genetic resources
“Justice” is a paramount ideal underlying the debates on how to regulate and use plant genetic resources. 
We discuss questions such as Who has rights to access and use these resources? How should benefits 
be shared? How should the use of genetic resources be regulated? Who should be involved in discussing 
these questions? All of these are questions concerning justice. They are asked and discussed with the 
aim of finding answers that take into account what is due to all those who have a stake in genetic 
resources. I have written this overview article from an understanding of justice in analytic philosophy.1 
Although there is wide agreement that justice is important, there may be different views on what it 
means to safeguard justice in the development of policy as well as in specific access and benefit sharing 
negotiations. One reason for such disagreement is that justice is a concept with different dimensions. I 
will distinguish between five such dimensions, which all play a role in dealing with genetic resources. 
The aim of this analysis is to contribute to the understanding of first, why the use of genetic resources 
generates so much attention and controversy, and second, what needs to be considered in regulating 
and handling them justly. By discussing these issues, I am addressing not only philosophers but also 
an interdisciplinary readership, hoping that the article provides an occasion for them to take a step 
back from the everyday occupation with genetic resources and to reflect on the ethical implications 
associated with their use. Ideally, this will contribute toward bringing more justice reflections into 
1 Even though justice in this sense requires considering other worldviews as part of doing justice to other communities, it 
cannot be denied that the approach itself is driven by a particular Western tradition of thought. It would be beyond the 
scope of this article to consider different cultural approaches to justice, but this work may serve as a starting point for a wider 
intercultural comparison. Moreover, I would like to clarify that this is not a work in legal theory, which interprets justice within 
a legal framework but rather in moral philosophy, reflecting on how the legal framework should be constructed in order to be 
able to respond and solve ethical challenges of justice. 
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the drafting or implementing of regulatory schemes. Moreover, 
these reflections may facilitate specific access and benefit-sharing 
(ABS) negotiations, which may be complicated by the fact that the 
different parties are prioritizing different dimensions of justice 
possibly without awareness of this source of disagreement.
After a brief introduction of the conception of justice underlying 
this article, each of the five dimensions of justice will be presented 
separately. For this purpose, I will start with a general introduction 
of the particularities of the respective justice dimension followed 
by a discussion of the role that it plays in the context of genetic 
resources. In doing so, I will draw on my own previous research 
and connect it to the philosophical work of other authors, for 
instance, Bram de Jonge and Doris Schroeder. Moreover, I will 
connect the literature on justice for genetic resources with parallel 
discourses on environmental justice or restorative justice. The 
presentation of the five dimensions of justice will be followed by 
the discussion of three practical justice challenges to illustrate 
how the justice dimensions meet: first, biopiracy; second, the 
distribution of environmental burdens; and third, plant genetic 
resources in agriculture. The article will close with two practical 
conclusions for a fair and equitable use of plant genetic resources.
FIVE DIMENSIONS OF JUSTICE IN 
DEALING WITH GENETIC RESOURCES
The three most influential international treaties that introduced 
ABS for genetic resources are the Convention on Biological 
Diversity (CBD),2 the Nagoya Protocol (NP),3 and the 
International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and 
Agriculture (ITPGRFA).4 These treaties have the explicit objective 
to ensure “fair and equitable sharing of benefits” from genetic 
resources. In spite of the prominence of the clause “fair and 
equitable,” for instance, in the full title of the Nagoya Protocol, 
and notwithstanding the long tradition that this clause has in 
investment treaties (Dolzer, 2005), its meaning remains undefined 
and vague (De Jonge, 2011; Vermeylen and Walker, 2011; 
Morgera, 2015). It is evident, however, that in one way or another 
fair and equitable benefit-sharing aims at introducing justice into 
the regulation and use of genetic resources. In that sense, Bram de 
Jonge discusses the question, What is fair and equitable benefit-
sharing? by analyzing different principles of justice (De Jonge, 
2011), and Morton Walloe Tvedt and Tomme Young also raise 
mainly justice topics in their analysis of the meaning of “fair and 
equitable” in ABS (Tvedt and Young, 2007: pp. 83–91).
For the purpose of this article, I assume that justice is a morally 
weighty demand, and I start from a very basic and general meaning 
of “justice” going back to the Roman law, where it was defined in 
the Institutes of Justinian as “the set and constant purpose which 
gives to every man his due” (Justinian, 1913: Book I, Title  I). 
2 The text of the Convention on Biological Diversity is available at: https://www.
cbd.int/convention/text/ (accessed May 2019).
3 The text of The Nagoya Protocol is available at: https://www.cbd.int/abs/ 
(accessed May 2019).
4 The text of the International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and 
Agriculture is available at: http://www.fao.org/plant-treaty/overview/texts-treaty/
en/ (accessed May 2019).
In a modern view, influenced by Enlightenment philosophy, 
this means that justice is based on the acknowledgment that 
all human beings have equal moral status and basic moral 
rights. I will distinguish between five different dimensions of 
justice: distributive justice, which deals with a fair distribution; 
commutative justice, which concerns a fair exchange of give-and-
receive; justice as recognition, which relates to treating all involved 
parties with the same respect; reparative justice, which pertains to 
fair amendments for wrongful actions in the past; and procedural 
justice, which is concerned with just decision processes (For an 
overview, see Table 1). Each of these justice dimensions takes 
up other aspects of what it means to give everybody their due. 
The aim of the following introduction of the five dimensions 
of justice is not to suggest what a just ABS system for genetic 
resources would look like. Instead, I attempt to contribute to a 
better understanding of the challenges at hand and the reasons 
why there is controversy surrounding how to solve them.5
Let me start now with the presentation of the five dimensions 
of justice, which refer to different aspects of what we owe to others.
DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE
Distributive justice is concerned with fair distribution of, for 
instance, material goods, such as natural resources. A large 
body of literature is dedicated to the question of who has rights 
to own, control, or benefit from natural resources (e.g., Nine, 
2012; Armstrong, 2017). Key questions in that discourse are 
to what extent nation states have exclusive rights to benefits 
from natural resources that are found on state territory, and 
whether or how all people around the globe should be able to 
benefit at least partially from those resources. Besides natural 
resources, the distribution of non-material goods, such as power 
or opportunities, has also received wide attention in political 
philosophy (Rawls, 1971; Dworkin, 2000). Although distributive 
justice can be based on the idea that a just distribution provides 
an equal share of the distributed good to each party, there are also 
alternative views. John Rawls, for instance, famously suggested 
a “difference principle” which is based on a maximin criterion, 
meaning that unequal distribution of income or wealth can be 
just if this distribution still leads to advantages for the worst-off 
party compared with the available alternatives (Rawls, 1971).
In addition to the importance of a fair distribution of goods, 
more recently the demand for distributive justice has also 
5 The five dimensions of justice should be understood as heuristic groups, which 
serve the aim of facilitating the analysis of justice questions that arise. I am not 
aiming at developing a theory of justice, I do thus not rank the dimensions of justice; 
none of them is treated as having general priority over the other. Moreover, I do not 
take any position as to whether one justice dimension is generally primary to another 
one. Therefore, I do, for instance, not argue in favour of or against Axel Honneth’s 
position according to which unjust distribution is a result of misrecognition (Fraser 
and Honneth, 2003). I acknowledge, however, that the different dimensions of justice 
can overlap. An unjust situation can concern more than one justice dimension. In 
the context of environmental justice, Gordon Walker, for example, highlighted that 
different dimensions of justice are often closely linked, procedural injustice can be 
an explanation for distributive injustice (Walker, 2012: p.47); then again, unjust 
distribution of power and money or misrecognition of certain communities can be 
a cause for unjust procedures. 
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been expressed regarding global and local bads. Distributive 
justice in this sense is one central pillar of the concept 
of “environmental justice” that goes back to a grassroots 
movement in the 1990s in the United States. The movement 
pointed to the existing environmental injustice when 
environmental risks and burdens, such as waste dumpsites, 
toxic emissions or other contaminations, are unequally 
distributed. Some communities endure more environmental 
burdens than others, and often, it is previously disadvantaged, 
marginalized, or impoverished groups that, in addition to 
these social injustices, also suffer environmental injustice 
(Bullard, 1993; Schlossberg, 2007; Walker, 2012).
Distributive Justice for Genetic Resources
Distributive justice is one of the most widely discussed justice 
dimensions in the literature on genetic resources (e.g. De Jonge 
and Korthals, 2006; Korthals and De Jonge, 2009; Schroeder 
and Pogge, 2009; Schroeder and Pisupati, 2010; Vermeylen 
and Walker, 2011; Deplazes-Zemp, 2019). The term “genetic 
resources” suggests that they are a type of natural resource, a 
view also supported by the current regulatory framework in 
which genetic resources are placed under state sovereignty 
over natural resources. The understanding of genetic resources 
as a type of natural resource directly links this discussion 
to the literature on resource rights (Deplazes-Zemp, 2019). 
However, to treat genetic resources analogously to other natural 
resources may be problematic because genetic resources are a 
very particular type of natural resource. They can be described 
as atypical with respect to first, their non-tangible nature; 
second, the close connection between natural and cultural 
formation; as well as third, their connection to biodiversity and 
its vulnerability (Deplazes-Zemp, 2018b). These three features 
of genetic resources are relevant when it comes to distributive 
justice (Deplazes-Zemp, 2019), therefore, I will explain each of 
them in some more detail. It has been highlighted that genetic 
resources are non-tangible and that they carry information 
(Vogel, 1994; Millum, 2010; De Jonge, 2011; Tvedt and Schei, 
2013; Ruiz Muller, 2015; Deplazes-Zemp, 2018b). I thus speak 
of the “informational” nature of these resources and suggest 
that this particular feature can best be illustrated by contrasting 
genetic resources with other biological resources such as timber 
or fish. While benefits from the latter are material and used 
as food or building material, it is the information in genetic 
resources that is of value among other things because it can lead 
to the generation of new material outside the provider country. 
According to such an interpretation of genetic resources it is thus 
the information that is exported from the country of origin and 
used and propagated, for instance in breeding processes or in 
biological or chemical procedures (Vogel, 1994; De Jonge, 2011; 
Ruiz Muller, 2015; Deplazes-Zemp, 2018b).6 The informational 
nature implies that territorial claims of countries of origin are 
more difficult to legitimize for genetic resources than for material 
natural resources. While in the case of material resources a 
constant supply from the country of origin is required for their 
use, in the case of genetic resources, only a one-time extraction 
of a small material sample is needed. Therefore, the territorial 
connection of the latter type of resource is weaker.
Although the question of how to share material or financial 
benefits from genetic resources is central to the debate, the Annex 
of the NP also lists a variety of potential non-monetary benefits 
from genetic resources that could be shared and that could be 
understood as a distribution of opportunities. The list includes 
benefits such as research collaboration, admittance to databases, 
access to scientific information, capacity-building and training.7 
In addition, Bram de Jonge and Michiel Korthals suggest that 
“upstream benefit-sharing” should also be taken into account for 
distributive justice; by this, they mean opportunities and power 
to influence research and development agendas in the context 
of genetic resources (De Jonge and Korthals, 2006; Korthals 
and De Jonge, 2009). The authors suggest that this distributive 
aspect should be considered in decision making procedures for 
different uses of genetic resources, which directly relates to what 
I will discuss later in the sections on justice as recognition and 
procedural justice.
Finally, the third atypical feature of genetic resources is 
that they are related to biodiversity through the diversity of 
species that actually or potentially carry genetic resources. 
Biodiversity could also be the source of evolution of novel 
genetic resources in the future, and it is the condition 
for intact ecosystems in which current genetic resources 
prosper. This connection implies that genetic resources are 
vulnerable to decimation and extinction of biodiversity. In 
contrast to many other natural resources and because of their 
informational nature, genetic resources are not endangered 
by over-exploitation but by other environmentally destructive 
practices against which they must be actively protected. It can 
thus be argued that distributive justice for genetic resources 
concerns not only the distribution of benefits but also the 
6 Although many authors acknowledge the informational nature of genetic 
resources (e.g. Vogel, 1994; Millum, 2010; De Jonge, 2011; Tvedt and Schei, 2013; 
Ruiz Muller, 2015; Deplazes-Zemp, 2018b), the definition of genetic resources in 
the CBD refers to „genetic material of actual or potential value“ and there is some 
controversy on how this should be interpreted (Tvedt and Schei, 2013).
7 Annex to the Nagoya Protocol (p. 24) available at: https://www.cbd.int/abs/ 
(accessed May 2019).
TABLE 1 | Comparing the different justice dimensions when justice in general 
means that everybody gets his or her due.
Justice dimension
Distributive justice To give everybody their due shares 
in benefits and costs. 
Commutative justice To give everybody the due 
compensation in exchange for a 
good or service that was provided.
Justice as recognition To give everybody their due respect.
Reparative justice To give due redress to those who 
suffered injustice and possibly 
due punishment to those who 
committed it. 
Procedural justice* To give everybody their due voice 
and participation in decision making 
processes. 
*Procedural justice is defined in the narrow sense used in the environmental justice 
discourse.
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costs for biodiversity protection. In other words, not only 
goods but also bads associated with genetic resources should 
be distributed fairly (Deplazes-Zemp, 2019).
COMMUTATIVE JUSTICE
Commutative justice is also called “justice in exchange” 
because it concerns a fair exchange of items or services 
with the goal of achieving equivalence between giving and 
receiving (Schroeder and Pogge, 2009; Schroeder and Pisupati, 
2010; De Jonge, 2011; Deplazes-Zemp, 2018a). In situations 
where goods are not exchanged for other goods but where 
products or services are exchanged for money, this leads to 
the discussion of just prices or just compensation, and is thus 
an important principle in the economic context (Koslowski, 
2001). The “Fairtrade” label, for instance, symbolizes the 
aim of generating more commutative justice in economic 
exchange between farmers in low-income countries and 
companies in the industrialized world. One of the great 
challenges in this justice dimension is to determine under 
what conditions both sides contribute equivalents to the 
exchange if they are of a different nature. To deal with these 
substantial difficulties, commutative justice is sometimes also 
understood in a more procedural sense, according to which 
an exchange is considered just if both parties voluntarily 
consent to the transaction procedure employed (Schroeder 
and Pisupati, 2010). In this case, an overstated price could 
be considered to be just as long as the buying party pays it 
voluntarily. Such an interpretation of commutative justice 
overlaps with the dimension of procedural justice that this 
article addresses later.
Commutative Justice for Genetic 
Resources
An ABS system for genetic resources can be understood as a 
mechanism to deal with the demands of commutative justice. ABS 
regulates how benefits should be shared in exchange for access 
to genetic resources (Schroeder and Pogge, 2009; Schroeder 
and Pisupati, 2010; De Jonge, 2011; Deplazes-Zemp, 2018a).8 
The existing focus on the commutative aspect in ABS has been 
criticized not only because it cannot account for the complexity 
of justice issues at stake but also because it introduces a clear 
separation between providers and users of genetic resources. 
Critics highlight that this does not reflect the real world, where 
genetic resources are also being used in so-called provider 
countries (particularly threshold countries) and where it is thus 
not possible to draw a clear line between the two categories 
(Korthals and De Jonge, 2009; Nijar et al., 2016). Moreover, it 
again seems to be the informational nature of genetic resources 
that complicates the application of commutative justice schemes, 
which have been developed for material goods. Although it 
may be relatively straightforward to determine the provider of a 
8 The “fair and equitable” clause could be read as another indication of a connection 
to commutative, since the term “equity” has been used to describe the aim of 
commutative justice (Adams, 1963; Cook and Hegtvedt, 1983).
material natural resource, such as a barrel of petrol, this is much 
more difficult in the case of genetic resources, which may have 
travelled a long distance in the form of a small material sample, 
an extract or even as a digital sequence before they are actually 
being used. This means that not only must resource access be 
controlled for actual users but any removal of minimal quantities 
of genetic resources, even for non-commercial purposes, must be 
monitored because they might be used as resources in the future 
(De Jonge, 2011). I suggested elsewhere that the informational 
nature of genetic resources is also responsible for another 
difficulty with ABS achieving commutative justice. We need to 
ask ourselves what it is that is actually being exchanged in ABS, 
who has claims on the exchanged goods, and how the claimant 
can be appropriately compensated (Deplazes-Zemp, 2018a). 
Does the provider state from the territory of which, for instance, 
a plant sample has been extracted, really have particular claims 
on this plant as a genetic resource? It is certainly true that the 
users of genetic resources gain from information in nature and 
it seems to be a legitimate request that they give something back 
in exchange for these free benefits. However, one may wonder 
whether provider states really are the appropriate recipients of 
such compensation or whether it should go, for example, directly 
to biodiversity protection projects, which preserved valuable 
genetic resources.9
Another interesting topic with regard to commutative 
justice is ABS for traditional knowledge associated with the 
use of genetic resources. If, for instance, a company uses the 
knowledge of an indigenous community about a particular 
health benefit of a plant, this knowledge is also subject to 
access and benefit-sharing negotiations. It can be argued 
that, from a commutative justice point of view, it makes a 
difference whether compensation is demanded in exchange 
for traditional knowledge or for providing access to a plant 
growing on state territory. Whereas in the latter case extensive 
claims on genetic resources might be difficult to legitimize, 
this is different for the case of traditional knowledge 
and likewise for domesticated plants. In these cases, the 
respective communities provide their intellectual good or the 
products of their work. This distinguishes their claims on this 
knowledge or plants from that of other communities. It can 
thus be reasoned that if communities provide such knowledge 
or breeding efforts, they have good reasons supported by 
commutative justice to demand compensation (Deplazes-
Zemp, 2018a).
9 The idea that those who use information in nature should pay compensation for 
the resulting benefits indicates that there is another justice aspect that could be 
considered in the context of plant genetic resources, namely ecological justice. 
Nicholas Low and Brendan Gleeson contrast ecological justice with environmental 
justice by explaining that the latter deals with “conflicts among humans over nature” 
whereas ecological justice deals with conflicts “between humans and nature” 
(Low and Gleeson, 1998: p. 49 emphasis in the original). Ecological justice is thus 
concerned with justice towards the non-human world (Schlossberg, 2007) which 
is beyond the scope of this article. Whereas on an ecological justice perspective, 
just compensation for information in nature would require giving something 
back to nature, I understand just compensation for natural information here as 
a compensation for those human communities who actively protect biodiversity.
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JUSTICE AS RECOGNITION
Justice as recognition is concerned with giving respect and 
recognition to every person.10 This means that each human being 
should be recognized for his or her equal moral status which at 
the same time implies that each person is respected for his or her 
individuality and differences to the norm (Taylor, 1992). Justice 
as recognition emphasizes that we owe recognition to others and 
that withholding recognition is a form of injustice. Feminists, 
racial movements, and multiculturalism are examples of political 
struggles for recognition. The importance of recognition has been 
supported by different philosophical arguments. For instance, 
Axel Honneth and Charles Taylor emphasize that recognition 
is a basic human need required for identity formation (Taylor, 
1992; Honneth, 1995; Fraser and Honneth, 2003). Nancy Fraser 
suggests that lack of recognition violates the moral principle of 
“participatory parity” and is, therefore, unjust (Fraser, 2000; 
Fraser, 2001; Fraser and Honneth, 2003).
Justice as recognition is, besides distributive justice, another 
focus in the discourse on environmental justice (Schlossberg, 
2007; Walker, 2012). As mentioned above, poor and minority 
communities often endure more environmental burdens such 
as waste dumpsites, toxic emissions, or other contaminations 
than privileged groups. In these cases unjust distribution usually 
occurs together with misrecognition of these groups who are 
being discriminated against and not given equal status in society. 
To achieve environmental justice, it is thus not enough to ensure 
fair distribution of risks and benefits; rather, it is also necessary 
to grant just recognition to members of different communities.
Justice as Recognition for Genetic 
Resources
Even though in the philosophical literature on genetic resources 
the term “recognition justice” rarely appears, this dimension of 
justice also plays an important role.11 The framing of ABS as a 
system that mediates between providers of genetic resources in 
the “Global South” and users in the “Global North” indicates that 
the addressed injustice has also to do with political, economic and 
cultural power relations at the global level. Although the division 
between users in the “North” and providers in the “South” is an 
oversimplification, it is often used in the literature to refer to an 
10 It might be objected that when I defined justice in general as meaning to 
“acknowledge that all human beings have equal moral status and basic moral 
rights” (see above) this already involves recognition, which thus is a precondition 
of all dimensions of justice. It is true that in order to be able to enter a justice 
relationship with someone and to identify injustices of any type I must recognise 
the other as having moral status and basic rights. However, there are cases of 
injustice, where none of the other justice dimensions have been violated but the 
injustice lies in a form of misrecognition, for instance cases where someone’s belief, 
culture or the like are not being respected. These cases where misrecognition per 
se is the injustice are discussed here under the heading of “justice as recognition.” 
The possibility that some form of basic misrecognition also underlies other types 
of injustice does not make it redundant to introduce a separate justice dimension 
of justice as recognition in order to account for the different types of injustice that 
can occur in practice. 
11 The following articles are exceptions in the sense that ABS is explicitly discussed 
in relation to environmental justice including recognition justice: (Vermeylen and 
Walker, 2011; Martin et al., 2013; Morgera, 2015; Martin et al., 2016).
unjust tendency. Industrialized countries often located in the 
“North” tend to profit from genetic resources, whereas biodiversity-
rich countries mostly in the “South” are expected to protect genetic 
resources as biodiversity. This situation is not only unjust from the 
point of view of distributive justice and commutative justice as 
discussed above but the North–South interactions in the context 
of genetic resources also concern justice as recognition. This 
justice dimension is violated when the “North” takes advantage of 
historical power relations associated with economic and political 
privileges. In such cases, users of genetic resources tend to decide 
when and how to access which genetic resources without respecting 
providers as equal partners nor considering their customs, 
culture, or values. This type of misrecognition not only occurs in 
North–South interactions but also within provider states, when 
governments do not respected cultures or rights of minority 
groups. To prevent such misrecognition at global and local level, 
CBD, NP, and ITPGRFA explicitly acknowledge rights and claims 
of indigenous and local communities. It has been argued that more 
attention should be paid to justice as recognition in the context of 
biodiversity conservation to consider cultural differences (Martin 
et al., 2016; Robinson and Forsyth, 2016). For instance, certain 
communities object to the idea of patenting life (Tauli-Corpuz, 2003; 
Robinson, 2010). To offer them a share in benefits associated with 
patents on genetic resources misrecognizes their values and world 
view. Bram De Jonge discusses these issues under the heading of 
“cognitive justice,” which he defines as concerning the “recognition 
of the plurality of knowledge systems” (De Jonge, 2011: p. 135). 
I decided to use the concept of “justice as recognition” rather than 
“cognitive justice” not only because of the former’s philosophical 
tradition and its use in the environmental justice literature but also 
because, in my view, to recognize the individuality of others goes 
beyond acknowledging the cognitive aspect of different world views. 
The notion of recognition justice emphasizes the importance of a 
respectful attitude by the more powerful. As mentioned above, 
a similar idea is found in the notion of upstream benefit-sharing, 
which Bram de Jonge and Michiel Korthals include in their broader 
conception of distributive justice (De Jonge and Korthals, 2006; 
Korthals and De Jonge, 2009).
REPARATIVE JUSTICE
I use the term “reparative justice” for the notion that redress is 
owed to those who suffered injustice in the past. In the literature, 
this dimension of justice is discussed under different related 
terms with sometimes overlapping and sometimes clearly distinct 
meanings (Daly and Proietti-Scifoni, 2011). Particularly in the legal 
context, the concept “retributive justice” is used for just punishment 
of those who committed injustice (Boersama, 2011; Daly and 
Proietti-Scifoni, 2011). This concept thus concentrates on the 
appropriate punishment of the offenders for the wrongs that they 
committed. In contrast, the term “corrective justice” usually refers 
to a conception of justice that focuses on the victims and on the just 
compensation that they should receive for suffered harms (Urban 
Walker, 2006). There are certain similarities between corrective 
justice and commutative justice. Both are linked to reciprocity, 
and both deal with just compensation. However, while the former 
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concerns simultaneous exchange procedures, the latter is backward-
looking and concerns compensation for something that happened 
in the past. “Restorative justice” is a third reparative justice concept 
besides “retributive justice” and “corrective justice.” Authors who 
use this concept highlights that righting injustice requires more 
than the remedy of harms: the important aim is to re-establish the 
relationship between victim and offender, usually in a relatively 
informal process, and to prevent that same type of injustice recurring 
in the future. Criminal trials are typically not seen as apt processes 
to establish restorative justice. Instead, reconciliation or mediation 
procedures are implemented in which offenders and victims meet, 
find the truth, and negotiate potential reparations (Johnstone and 
Van Ness, 2007; Marshall, 1999). Reparations in this sense are not 
necessarily material but can also consist of a formal apology (Urban 
Walker, 2006; Sharpe, 2007). A famous example of such a procedure 
was the Truth and Reconciliation Commission that was set up to 
address injustices committed during the apartheid era in South 
Africa. The importance that is given to establishing a relationship of 
mutual respect connects to “justice as recognition” described above. 
This illustrates once more how the different dimensions of justice 
overlap.
When I refer to “reparative justice,” I use it as an umbrella 
term to cover retributive justice, corrective justice, and 
restorative justice,12 with the idea that all of these aspects may 
play a role in righting injustice that took place in the past. In 
the environmental context, reparative justice, for instance, plays 
a role in climate justice, when it comes to the “polluter pays” 
principle (Caney, 2006; Caney, 2010). In Simon Caney’s words, 
this principle suggests that “those who caused a problem[ … ] 
should foot the bill” (Caney, 2006: p. 752). This can be understood 
as a demand for corrective justice, meaning that the polluters are 
responsible for repairing the damage that they caused. Maybe the 
“polluter pays” principle could also be interpreted as an example 
of retributive justice, particularly when one of the discussed 
objections to the principle is that the polluters were not aware 
of the effects of their actions and thus should not be the ones 
who pay (Caney, 2010). Based on that view, it would not be just 
to punish people for something that they caused unintentionally.
Reparative Justice for Genetic Resources
Reparative justice is not a predominant justice dimension 
behind the notion of ABS for genetic resources. Doris Schroeder 
and Balakrishna Pisupati suggest that while distributive and 
commutative justice are directly relevant for ABS, reparative 
justice only plays a role in cases of non-compliance with the 
protocol which would trigger punishment and repair measures 
(Schroeder and Pisupati, 2010). However, the reparative justice 
dimension may still be relevant to understand why and how ABS 
systems have been implemented. The aim and need to redress 
some of the historical wrongs that were perpetrated—generally 
speaking—by the “Global North” against the “South” could be 
12 Some conceptions of restorative justice seem not to be covered by my concept 
of “reparative justice”. For instance, what Johnstone and Van Ness call, the 
“encounter conception of restorative justice”, which emphasizes the importance 
of the encountering process rather than the aim of redressing those who suffered 
injustice (Johnstone and Van Ness, 2007).
an underlying political motivation for establishing ABS systems. 
During colonial times, citizens of many biodiversity-rich states in 
the “Global South” suffered exploitation, oppression, subordination 
and disrespect, which amounts to injustice at the distributive, 
commutative and recognition dimensions. It cannot be denied that 
today colonial-like power relations still persist when the “North” 
exerts its strong political, cultural, and economical influence on the 
“South” accompanied by the same type of justice violation known 
from colonial times. From such a perspective, acknowledging 
biodiversity-rich states’ sovereignty over genetic resources could 
be understood as an acknowledgment of past misconduct as well 
as a commitment to consider the interests of less affluent countries 
in the future. That ABS systems are related to historical injustice 
has also been described by Jorge Cabrera Medaglia when he wrote: 
“The roots of ABS can be traced to colonialism and efforts by 
colonial powers to gain control of the trade in key commodities 
such as rubber, tea, and cinchona for their own benefit, with little 
regard for the communities and economies from which these 
resources originated” (Medaglia, 2015: p. 196). Moreover, Elisa 
Morgera highlighted that reparative justice played a role in the 
negotiations of the NP, when the African group demanded that 
benefit sharing should be extended to genetic resources which are 
available in ex situ collections, i.e., ones that had been exported 
from the country of origin in the past (Morgera, 2015: pp. 11–12).
PROCEDURAL JUSTICE
The term “procedural justice” has been used in a wider and a 
narrower sense. According to the former, this dimension of 
justice is concerned with any type of procedure that leads to a 
just outcome judged by criteria of other (substantive) justice 
dimensions. The narrower sense of procedural justice plays 
an important role in environmental justice, where procedural 
justice is discussed as the third central justice dimension besides 
distributive justice and justice as recognition (Schlossberg, 
2007; Walker, 2012; Bell and Carrick, 2018). In this narrower 
sense, procedural justice concerns decision procedures and is 
achieved if the voice and interests of all involved parties are being 
considered. Because environmental justice was first the program 
of a social movement before it became a theoretical field of study, 
this procedural aspect has been particularly pivotal. One of the 
main aims of the movement was the empowerment of affected 
communities. Participatory approaches as a means for just 
procedures in decision making thus play an important role.
As for other justice dimensions different principles of justice have 
also been suggested for procedural justice. Derek Bell and Jayne 
Carrick distinguish three conceptions of procedural justice in the 
environmental justice discourse, which focus on three alternative 
principles (Bell and Carrick, 2018). The first principle is political 
equality according to which all affected parties should have an 
equal voice in the sense of equal power in environmental decision 
making (Bell and Carrick refer to: Shrader-Frechette, 2002). As 
an alternative, the principle of proportionality emphasizes that 
power in decision making should reflect the relative stake of the 
involved parties in the outcome of the decision (Bell and Carrick 
refer to: Bell and Rowe, 2012). The third conception of procedural 
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environmental justice introduced by Bell and Carrick is based 
on the principle of plurality. Advocates of this principle criticize 
procedural justice conceptions emphasizing equality because 
they suppress difference, but it is argued that just procedures 
should consider differences in perspectives or interests. This is 
the same argument that is invoked in the literature on justice as 
recognition. Although the three principles for just procedures are 
discussed as three alternative ideals in the theoretical discourse, 
in practical environmental decision making they are combined in 
participatory approaches (Bell and Carrick, 2018).
Procedural Justice for Genetic Resources
A focus on fair decision procedures is particularly relevant in 
the context of genetic resources because, as mentioned earlier, 
political and economic power between providers and users are 
often unequally distributed, which is a violation of recognition 
justice and/or distributive justice. Just decision procedures are 
thus not only an aim in themselves but also an approach to 
achieve more justice along other dimensions. The NP addresses 
some of these problems, for instance by highlighting rights of 
indigenous and local communities or by requesting scientific 
and technological collaboration (NP, Article 23). Moreover, one 
article of the NP is dedicated to capacity-building, it requires 
that all parties should cooperate in the endeavor of ensuring 
that also less affluent parties have the capacities to engage in 
the outlined ABS procedure (NP, article 22). Prior Informed 
Consent (PIC) and Mutually Agreed Terms (MAT) are two 
procedural requirements in the NP. Users of genetic resources 
must obtain PIC from providers.13 In response, the providers can 
authorize access to the resource under the condition that MAT 
are negotiated. Besides the conditions for the access to genetic 
resources MAT also determine the benefits that will be shared 
(Greiber et al., 2012; Biber-Klemm and Martinez, 2016). From 
a procedural justice point of view, these two elements should be 
implemented with a focus on the principles of political equality, 
proportionality and/or plurality. To what extent the procedure 
is participatory and considers these principles, particularly also 
concerning involvement of indigenous and local communities, 
depends not only on the users but also the provider states. 
Therefore, there is a considerable leeway to consider more or less 
procedural justice within the legal framework.
JUSTICE CHALLENGES IN USING 
GENETIC RESOURCES
In the article so far, I have attempted to show that all of the 
introduced dimensions of justice play a role in the context of 
ABS for genetic resources. In the following, I will discuss three 
particular justice challenges that arise in the use of plant genetic 
resources: first, biopiracy; second, environmental burdens from 
biodiversity conservation; and third, plant genetic resources 
in agriculture. These examples should illustrate the role that 
13 PIC implies that before accessing the resource in question, the potential user 
must provide all the relevant information on the intended utilization project, 
including the conditions of access as well as the intended use.
different justice dimensions play in the discourse and how they 
are being addressed or overlooked. In the course of this analysis, 
it will become evident that justice challenges must be addressed at 
two different levels: on the one hand the institutional level, which 
is represented by national and international policy; and on the 
other hand, the individual project level, which concerns specific 
projects of resource use with their respective ABS negotiations.
CHALLENGE 1: BIOPIRACY
To explain which types of injustice the ABS scheme of the CBD 
addresses, authors frequently invoke the problem of biopiracy 
(e.g. Kamau et al., 2010; Millum, 2010). The term refers to 
unauthorized use of genetic resources or traditional knowledge 
in the development of a product. Those accused of biopiracy did 
not share any benefits, recognition or material profit with the 
community that provided the resources or knowledge in question. 
Particularly when traditional knowledge is involved, biopiracy is 
a violation of commutative justice because the providers of this 
knowledge made an essential contribution to the final product, for 
which they were not compensated. However, biopiracy is not only a 
violation of commutative justice. When traditional knowledge was 
used without the consent of the community, justice as recognition 
was also violated, because the members of the community were 
not respected as equal negotiation partners and their rights to 
their cultural heritage were not acknowledged. One of the aims of 
ABS in the CBD and NP was to address this type of commutative 
injustice and misrecognition by introducing just procedures with 
the requirement for PIC and MAT not only for the export of genetic 
resources but also for the use of traditional knowledge.
However, using the famous case of the Hoodia cactus, Saskia 
Vermeylen and Gordon Walker showed that the implementation of 
an ABS agreement alone does not automatically warrant recognition 
justice or procedural justice. The succulent plant Hoodia gordoniiwa 
was used as an appetite suppressant by the San, a hunter-gatherer 
community in southern Africa. In 1996, scientists of the South 
African Council for Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR) 
isolated and patented the active compound of Hoodia, without 
involving the San or acknowledging their active contribution. 
Eventually, under external pressure, the CSIR eventually got in 
touch with the San, recognized their contribution, and in 2003 
the CSIR and the South African San Council signed a benefit-
sharing agreement (Beattie, 2005; Wynberg, 2005; Vermeylen and 
Walker, 2011). Even though the CSIR obtained PIC by the official 
representatives of the San, Vermeylen and Walker doubt that this 
was a case of procedural justice. In some places, the process was not 
really participatory because most group members were not aware 
of it. Moreover, the San did not receive enough legal and strategic 
assistance in the negotiation process and their opinion was not 
really taken into account. Vermeylen and Walker further cite the 
Hoodia Benefit-Sharing agreement as a case of violation of justice 
as recognition, which requires not only recognizing the other party 
as a partner with equal status and rights but also acknowledging 
and considering differences in culture and political tradition 
(Vermeylen and Walker, 2011). The San are known as an egalitarian 
community that functions without formal political institutions and 
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power hierarchies, but with decision making processes that involve 
consensus procedures. Even if the PIC and MAT procedures had 
been performed according to liberal democratic Western ideals, 
they would have been inflicted on this community against its 
own political tradition and values, because only a selection of 
representatives where involved in the negotiations.
Finally, in the Hoodia example, reparative justice also plays 
a role. As mentioned above, the CSIR originally patented the 
active compound in Hoodia without involving the San, and it 
acknowledged their contribution only under external pressure. 
The San thus had been wronged and the question is whether it 
is enough to ensure commutative, recognition and procedural 
justice in the future or whether, in addition, material or symbolic 
reparation would be appropriate.
CHALLENGE 2: ENVIRONMENTAL 
BURDENS FROM BIODIVERSITY 
CONSERVATION
The second justice challenge in the context of plant genetic 
resources concerns the background against which the ABS 
system has been developed in the CBD. The CBD has three 
main objectives, first, the conservation of biodiversity; second, 
the sustainable use of its components; and third, the fair and 
equitable sharing of benefits from genetic resources. The first 
objective places high demands on biodiversity-rich countries, 
which at the same time are often low-income countries in 
the “South” that struggle with poverty. The second objective, 
too, addresses particularly this group of countries, because 
industrialized countries in the “North” already went through 
industrial development, albeit in a non-sustainable way. It thus 
seems that the “Global South” carries a disproportionate burden 
when it comes to biodiversity conservation, even if affluent 
countries cover some of the conservation costs. Biodiversity-rich 
countries are affected, for instance by opportunity costs resulting 
from the requirement to setup protection areas which implies that 
communities living on that land waive the right to cultivate it. 
Other burdens associated with conservation projects include the 
displacement of local communities to restrict human influence 
on the respective area (Agrawal and Redford, 2009). In that sense, 
the burden of biodiversity conservation is not distributed justly. 
What makes this distributive injustice more pronounced is that 
benefits from the use of genetic resources, directly attributable 
to the effort of conserving biodiversity, tend to flow into the 
“Global North”. The request to ensure that the “South” also gets a 
share in benefits could thus be understood as a means to achieve 
more distributive justice. I suggest elsewhere that mitigation of 
the unfair distribution of burdens and benefits from biodiversity 
could be linked through a global biodiversity fund, which would 
be supported by those who benefit from genetic resources and 
would be disbursed for biodiversity conservation projects 
(Deplazes-Zemp, 2019). Interestingly, the Multilateral System of 
the ITPGRFA has established a similar type of fund financed by 
benefits from genetic resources and is used to support projects 
in conservation or development of agriculture. However, as will 
be elaborated below, the fund of the Multilateral System was 
not primarily set up with the aim to ensure fair distribution 
of the burden of biodiversity conservation but to ensure food 
security. These distributive justice issues could be implemented 
at the institutional level, but when it comes to individual ABS 
negotiations, genetic resource users could also acknowledge this 
issue, for instance by contributing directly to justly designed 
biodiversity conservation projects in the provider country.
The idea that those who profit from biodiversity, for instance in 
bioprospecting projects, contribute to biodiversity conservation 
can also be understood as a requirement of commutative justice. 
Based on this view, the contribution would be understood as a 
form of compensation for the possibility to benefit from genetic 
resources, which persisted thanks to biodiversity conservation 
(Deplazes-Zemp, 2018a).
Justice as recognition is important in this context too. It is 
necessary to recognize and consider the differing values, norms 
and needs of the contracting parties to be able to understand 
burdens associated with biological conservation, as well as 
the benefits that could be shared. Being open to other world 
views may involve, for instance, calling into question our own 
understanding of biodiversity and nature as opposed to humanity 
(De Jonge, 2011; Martin et al., 2013).
Finally, at least at the institutional level the dimension of 
reparative justice also plays a role when it comes to the connection 
between ABS for genetic resources and environmental burdens. 
That biodiversity is threatened today is to a large degree a 
consequence of the lifestyle and unsustainable development 
in the “Global North”. With reference to reparative justice, one 
might thus reason for a “destroyer pays” principle analogous to 
the “polluter pays” principle in the context of climate justice. 
Moreover, biodiversity conservation may also have a colonial 
legacy, because important national parks were established for the 
benefit of colonial rulers without any consideration for traditional 
culture and lifestyle (Chan and Satterfield, 2013). Even if current 
ABS negotiations may not be the right occasion to repair these 
historical injustices, awareness and acknowledgment of the need 
for reparative justice may help to understand and respect the 
situation of communities and states in biodiversity-rich regions.
CHALLENGE 3: PLANT GENETIC 
RESOURCES IN AGRICULTURE
Plant genetic resources used in agriculture pose additional justice 
challenges to other types of genetic resources. In the following 
I will emphasize the role of the different dimensions of justice 
in these particular challenges. One of the differences between 
plant genetic resources in agriculture and, for instance, genetic 
resources of plants in the rainforest, is that agricultural plants 
are not purely natural (e.g., Halewood et al., 2013; Deplazes-
Zemp, 2018b). They are domesticated, meaning that they are the 
result of breeding processes in which humans shaped crops over 
centuries. In contrast to purely natural resources, domesticated 
plants were generated by certain communities, farmers, and 
breeders or more recently by scientists in companies, who thus 
have particular claims on these plants. In that sense, a demand 
to distribute benefits from these resources equally among 
Challenges of Justice in Plant Genetic ResourcesDeplazes-Zemp
9 October 2019 | Volume 10 | Article 1266Frontiers in Plant Science | www.frontiersin.org
everybody (those who contributed to the plant and those who 
did not do so) seems to be more difficult to legitimize. Farmers or 
breeders who “improved” these plants can appeal to commutative 
justice and argue that if they make these plants available, their 
effort and creativity should be acknowledged and compensated 
(Deplazes-Zemp, 2018a; Deplazes-Zemp, 2018b). Intellectual 
property rights (IPR), such as patents and plant breeders’ rights, 
have been used as mechanisms to implement such compensation 
by ensuring that only the holders of these rights are entitled 
to commercially benefit from the plant in question. Although 
these property rights may be well suited to acknowledging the 
contribution of scientific innovation of commercial breeders in 
industrialized countries, they are unsuitable to account for the 
collective contributions of small-scale farmers in low-income 
countries, where the use and generation of novel varieties go 
hand in hand and cannot be assigned to individual breeders who 
put the crop on the market at one particular moment (Borowiak, 
2004; Correa, 2015; Oguamanam, 2018; Adebola, 2019). IPR 
over plant genetic resources, thus, raise a variety of justice issues. 
They fail to achieve commutative justice because farmers with 
particular claims on these resources cannot profit from the IPR 
system. Moreover, this is also a case of misrecognition. IPR fail to 
take into account agricultural practices of farmers in low-income 
countries. Consequently, not only the particular contributions 
of these farmers to valuable agricultural plants are being 
misrecognized but also the claims that these communities have on 
their products and their particular interests to be compensated if 
their products are being used. To correct these commutative and 
recognition injustices toward small-scale farmers, the concept of 
“farmers’ rights” was brought into the discourse to account for 
the generation of new varieties by farmers and grant them certain 
rights over these plant genetic resources (Borowiak, 2004). The 
ITPGRFA was the first international binding treaty that explicitly 
recognized farmers’ rights; in addition, the literature also 
discussed ABS as outlined in the CBD and NP as an approach 
that allows accounting for farmers’ contributions via PIC and 
MAT (Correa, 2015; Oguamanam, 2018; Adebola, 2019).
How different dimensions of justice come together and may 
lead to different expectations in case of plant genetic resources in 
agriculture can also be illustrated with the previously mentioned 
Multilateral System of the ITPGRFA. The Multilateral System 
provides facilitated access to 64 of the most important crops and 
requires that those who accessed genetic resources through this 
system will freely share resulting benefits or pay a percentage of 
their profits into a common fund.14 Agricultural plant genetic 
resources covered under the Multilateral System can be accessed 
without obtaining PIC and negotiating MAT but by using a 
standard template the “Standard Material Transfer Agreement” 
(SMTA) negotiated by the Parties to the ITPGRFA. However, 
since benefits from the use of these resources do not flow to the 
provider but to the Multilateral System as a third party, none of 
the contracting parties have a particular interest in monitoring 
compliance with the SMTA. To address this problem, the 
concept of the “Third-Party Beneficiary” has been introduced 
14 The Multilateral System: http://www.fao.org/plant-treaty/areas-of-work/the-
multilateral-system/overview/en/ (accessed May 2019).
into the SMTA. The parties to the SMTA agree that the Third-
Party Beneficiary has certain rights, for instance, to monitor 
compliance with the agreement (Manzella, 2013; Moore, 2013).
Analyzed from the stance of the different dimensions of 
justice, the problem of compliance with the SMTA arises because 
of the combination of two justice dimensions. An agreement 
between providers and users of genetic resources usually aims at 
implementing commutative justice by ensuring that the exchange 
is fair. In contrast, the Multilateral System supports distributive 
justice ensuring that the possibility to access and benefit from 
these resources is distributed fairly and recognition justice in the 
sense of recognizing basic rights to food. These aims can, however, 
not be secured by a procedure that involves only two “self-
interested” negotiation parties. The introduction of the Third-Party 
Beneficiary can thus be understood as a means ensure distributive 
or recognition justice in a commutative justice framework.
As just indicated, the Multilateral System points to another, 
more fundamental, ethical challenge raised by agricultural plant 
genetic resources, which has to do with the role of agriculture in 
the production of staple foods and in ensuring food security (De 
Jonge and Korthals, 2006). Safeguarding this role of agricultural 
genetic resources was the main motivation to provide facilitated 
access to the 64 crops covered under the Multilateral System. 
Food is a basic good that people need for health and well-being, 
therefore, an understanding of humans as beings with basic moral 
rights implies the duty of ensuring food security. This aim goes 
beyond what is demanded by a classical natural resource oriented 
understanding of distributive justice.15 While the latter demands 
fair distribution of existing goods, the basic moral right to food 
necessitates safeguarding that enough food is available. This can 
lead to a positive duty to ensure that food can be produced also, for 
instance, under changed climatic conditions.16
Recognition justice is also relevant in this context, when it 
is demanded that every person’s moral right to food must be 
acknowledged with consideration for varying needs and interests. 
Bram de Jonge pointedly describes how there is a certain type of 
tension between this basic moral requirement of ensuring food 
security17 and commutative justice (De Jonge, 2011). Although 
the first moral requirement suggests that farmers or breeders who 
develop new staple foods should make them available to everybody, 
the latter demands that they be compensated for their products. 
However, from the identification of such a tension it does not follow 
that one of the moral requirements must be prioritized. Instead, the 
situation can be understood as the challenge to find solutions to 
implement both moral demands. This challenge cannot only be 
addressed at the institutional level by drafting all-encompassing 
15 This may not apply to a less traditional conception of distributive justice 
associated with the notion of “upstream benefit-sharing” suggested by Bram de 
Jonge and Michiel Korthals. According to this understanding distributive justice 
needs to focus on a globally more just distribution of opportunities to set the 
research and innovation agenda. This could lead to a prioritization of the positive 
duty of ensuring that food resources are being generated where they are scarce (De 
Jonge and Korthals, 2006; Korthals and De Jonge, 2009).
16 An according duty could have been a motivation to facilitate, and thereby 
encourage, access to the 64 most important crops for farmers, breeders and 
researchers in the Multilateral System.
17 De Jonge speaks of a “principle of need and equity” (De Jonge, 2011: p137f).
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regulations; it must also be addressed at the individual project level, 
by acknowledging and rewarding contributions to agricultural 
plants even when this may not be explicitly required by the 
regulatory scheme.
The purpose of this section was to illustrate that usually more 
than one justice dimension is concerned in justice challenges 
involving plant genetic resources. This insight can be practically 
relevant for at least three reasons.
First, too narrow a focus on one dimension of justice may 
lead to unsatisfying results, because injustice at other dimensions 
persists, for instance, if biopiracy is seen exclusively as a violation of 
commutative justice and aspects of justice as recognition or reparative 
justice are being ignored. Although PIC and MAT may suffice to 
warrant commutative justice as defined in a Western context, justice 
as recognition requires considering potential conflicts of values 
between the involved parties. Consequently even our own principles 
of procedural justice may need reflection as described in the case of 
negotiations with the San above. The problems with benefit sharing 
as part of the Multilateral System also indicated that the focus on 
only one dimension of justice is not sufficient. A procedure that was 
constructed to deal with commutative justice needs adaptation to 
be able to address aims of distributive justice or recognition justice.
Second, tensions may arise between the different justice 
dimensions. For instance, certain parties highlight that plant 
genetic resources in agriculture are cultural products and those 
who developed them have special claims on benefits, which need to 
be considered by commutative justice. Others, however, highlight 
that as resources relevant for food security, plant genetic resources 
should be freely available and subject to distributive or recognition 
justice. The previously mentioned biopiracy case involving the San 
also reveals tensions between an ideal of procedural justice and 
justice as recognition. In certain cases, this type of tension may lead 
to difficult ethical dilemmas, for instance, when a community for 
traditional reasons does not agree to involve women or young people 
in decision procedures. Should their culture be respected or should 
the participatory ideals of procedural justice be implemented?18
Third, the focus on different justice dimensions may lead 
to different expectations in negotiation processes. In the 
discussed biopiracy case, the companies understood their task 
in the first place in the sense of commutative justice as providing 
compensation. However, the San also expected to be recognized. 
Although officially ABS systems are drafted to achieve 
commutative justice at the level of individual projects, certain 
stakeholders also seem to expect that such a system establishes 
distributive justice at a global and international level.
CONCLUSIONS
In this article, I introduced five dimensions of justice that play 
a role in dealing with plant genetic resources in “wild” nature 
18 Usually, it is held that recognition justice cannot justify the violation of basic 
human rights. In that sense, the United National Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP) also requires that indigenous peoples’ institutional 
structures and their procedures need to be “in accordance with international 
human rights standards” (UNDRIP, article 34, available at https://www.un.org/esa/
socdev/unpfii/documents/DRIPS_en.pdf (accessed August 2019)).
and agriculture, namely distributive justice, commutative justice, 
justice as recognition, reparative justice, and procedural justice. I 
then analyzed how these dimensions meet and overlap in some of 
the major justice challenges faced in the context of plant genetic 
resources. The article aims at giving some insight into why the 
use of genetic resources generates so much controversy and into 
what needs to be considered in regulating and handling them 
justly. I will respond to these aims with two conclusions for a just 
use of plant genetic resources.
First conclusion: Justice challenges posed by the use of plant 
genetic resources are multi-faceted and cannot be addressed by 
focusing exclusively on one dimension of justice. The analysis 
of the literature shows that different authors concentrate on 
different justice-related questions raised by genetic resources. 
I presented these different questions along the five introduced 
dimensions of justice. They often overlap, but to reduce the 
justice challenges to one or two of these dimensions would not 
do justice to the complexity of practical issues. Assuming that 
all of the justice dimensions are strong moral demands, we thus 
need to account for each dimension and consider how we can 
address them together when we work toward more fairness and 
equity in dealing with plant genetic resources.
Second conclusion: Because justice challenges are multi-
faceted, they cannot be met at the institutional level alone, 
but the challenges must be identified and addressed for each 
case individually. This overview article indicates that existing 
institutional ABS frameworks can be used to address several 
of the justice challenges, but at the same time these regulatory 
frameworks seem not sufficient to meet the challenges. 
Therefore, it is particularly important that the individual 
users of genetic resources, including researchers who work in 
non-commercial projects, are also aware of the issues at stake 
and find individualized solutions to address them. There is 
a risk that the increasing administrative burden associated 
with ABS obscures the actual justice issues at stake. However, 
losing sight of these issues at the project level would certainly 
work against the aim of increasing fairness and equity in ABS 
for plant genetic resources.
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